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1.

Introduction

Among Warren Samuels’ many contributions to the field of economic methodology, his
influential defense of methodological pluralism stands out, both as an important reflection
on his overall thinking about economics and policy and in the challenges it poses to
conventional views about knowledge and truth in economics.1 Though Samuels only began
characterizing his thinking as methodologically pluralist relatively late in his career, he had
advanced ideas from the beginning, based on his extensive study of the history of economic
theory and policy, which could have easily gone by that name. Thus, when in the late 1990s
economic methodologists began to debate what the terms ‘pluralist’ and ‘pluralism’ meant
and implied about economics (see, Salanti and Screpanti, 1997), Samuels was well
prepared to articulate his interpretation of them. Indeed he was already familiar with
methodological pluralism as had been developed in connection with the history and
philosophy of science by Paul Feyerabend in Against Method (Feyerabend, 1975), which
Samuels had probably read by the late 1970s at the latest.2 Nonetheless, his own views
were primarily the product of his understanding of intellectual history and economics, so
that it was not the logic of knowledge and truth as abstract epistemological categories
which drove his thinking about pluralism, but more what history told us about what
economic theories and policies could achieve in the way of persuasiveness and credibility
in a world in which they were regarded as more or less adequate and generally contested.
At the same time, Samuels also believed that there were fundamental – indeed existential –
1
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limits on what human thinking could achieve in any domain, and he used this philosophical
view of the world to explain how economic theories and policies acquired an at best
tenuous status that he believed called for a pluralist stance. However, his methodological
pluralism also left him with a problem about which he felt strongly, namely, whether he
ought to regard himself as a relativist, a much maligned posture in a time when positive
science was a largely unquestioned ideal (despite – or perhaps partly on account of –
Feyerabend’s defense of anarchism), and this led him to develop his unrepentant ‘limited
but affirmative’ defense of nihilism against the charge of skepticism.
This paper seeks to explain the nature and grounds for Samuels’ understanding of
methodological pluralism. The second section presents his critique of the idea that there
are epistemological foundations for knowledge and truth in connection with what he called
a ‘matrix approach to meaningfulness.’ The third section discusses his view of the
limitations of human psychology, given the nature of social reality, and his emphasis on the
necessity of making existential choices in regard to theory and policy when meta-principles
which might justify those choices do not exist. The fourth section describes Samuels’
relativist position and his defense of it against the charge of skepticism in connection with
his view that knowledge needs to be seen as socially constructed. The last section closes by
commenting on possible implications of Samuels’ methodological pluralism for the
historiography, or economic methodology, of the history of economics.

2.

‘The matrix approach to meaningfulness’
3

Samuels always saw the history of economics as intellectual history (Samuels, 1972). The
history of economics could not be confined to a record of doctrines economists have
advanced, particularly as found in a handful of key written texts, since these doctrines had
to be understood in their historical context along with many other types of historical
evidence and materials. That is, economic doctrines do not stand on their own, however
plausible and well-argued they may appear to be, but have their meaning and credibility
according to how well they along with many other historical materials speak to the issues
of their time. While this seems an obvious and correct point to make about how to
understand the history of economics, Samuels argued that it turns out to be more farreaching than it initially appears when one considers the character of the world which
economic doctrines must somehow explain together with the problem of representation.
First, social reality is itself heterogeneous and ambiguous … [which] permits a
complex and heterogeneous body of knowledge thereof. Second, our modes of
intellectualizing and interpreting social reality are complex and heterogeneous:
there are diverse epistemological credentials, diverse modes of thought, and diverse
systems of rationality (306).
Both sides of the equation, that is, social reality and our thinking about it thus have many
dimensions, and the problem of representation is that this makes their fit to one another an
especially complicated matter. Despite this, Samuels’ opinion about how we ought to
proceed is nonetheless clear. Contrary to the popular view that a well-developed economic
theory is coherent, cohesive, and consistent, he argues that a well-developed economic
theory must rather be multi-faceted, flexible, and ambiguous in crucial ways if it is to be
4

serviceable for representing a world that is of a similar character. In effect, since there are
many points of possible contact between economics and the economy, tightly constructed
theories are unlikely to capture much and at best possess small scope. What we need
instead are theories and economic policies which are openended enough that they can fit
the world in more ways than we are able to anticipate.
This then tells us something important for Samuels about the producers of economic
theory and policy. They do not – cannot – all see the world in the same way, because they
occupy different locations in a world which is uneven and varied across its many locations.
This implies that there must always be “differences in problems and questions posed and
treated, and differences between answers to the same and to different questions and
problems” (307).
Looked at differently, there are different definitions of problems, different methods
for obtaining data, different methods for drawing conclusions from data, different
methods for the collation and reconciliation of differing conclusions draw from data;
hence a diversity of ways of conceiving and solving problems, with competing and
complementary resolutions and emphases, and with fundamental incompleteness a
characteristic of each (307).
It can hardly be said, then, that “the development of economic thought [is] progress from
error to truth, rather than … a complex process and structure of inquiry and the conflict of
ideas” (308). But how, then, should we investigate this “complex process and structure of
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inquiry” if we hope to make sense of it? Samuels’ answer was his ‘matrix approach to
meaningfulness.’
The basic idea behind his ‘matrix approach to meaningfulness’ is that ‘the meaningfulness
of ideas, theories, and schools of thought resides in the matrix formed by the totality of
views of each held by both advocates and critics’ (Samuels, 1995, 353). Two key concepts
are central to this view. First, there is the standpoint or perspective (or selective
perception as Samuels often put it) that determines a theorist’s point of entry. Its existence
implies that any one theory or text is always limited by its perspective, and thus the notion
that a theory can be general or comprehensive is a fallacy. ‘Truth,’ such as it is for Samuels,
only emerges in the complex exchange between people operating from different
perspectives, some of whom may be supportive of a theory and some of whom may be
critical. This accordingly leads us to ask: how does this ‘emergence’ actually take place?
Second, then, the necessity of perspective implies the inevitability of criticism. “Criticism is
important to elicit both the strengths and limitations and therefore the meaningfulness and
the multiplicity of nuances and meanings as something is viewed from different positions”
(354). Criticism for Samuels is accordingly the means by which economic theory and policy
can emerge as coherent and acquire social impact. To be clear, criticism is not the same
thing as skepticism. Rather it is simply the recurring sharp edge of a discipline’s shared
investigation which taken as a whole can be explained as a process. In that regard, Samuels
tells us that his ‘general strategy of inquiry … begins with a modified version of the DiltheyWeber concept of verstehen, moves on to Whitehead’s concept of perspective, and concludes
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with Cohen’s systematic relativism or field theory’ (318).3 The concept of verstehen, one
should note, adds an interesting dimension to Samuels’ interpretation of position and
perspective. Essentially it means “the historian [puts] himself into the position of the
original thinkers, to understand like, indeed, to think like them” (318). The historian is
thus able to compare different perspectives, and consequently experience what is involved
in (hypothetically) giving up one’s own perspective.
This intellectual exercise, when carried out over many individuals, produces what Samuels
then calls systematic relativism (perhaps his first careful statement of his understanding of
relativism as a coherent doctrine). His position is straightforward. When historians with
different views imaginatively put themselves in one another’s places, they learn to carry
out a kind of two-level, analogical reasoning that Cohen associated with a research
community’s shared development of a field of disparate yet interconnected ideas.
Systematic relativism depends on the researcher having “the insight that whatever can be
said in one system can probably also be said in another seemingly mutually exclusive
system, so that knowledge or understanding resides not only in that which can be said in
each relevant system but also in the formulation of the difference(s) between the systems
making them to appear so formidably mutually exclusive” (320). Thus systematic
relativism is also characterized as field theory, since general understanding resides in the
field of ideas and their positions in relation to one another. As Samuels explains Cohen’s
thinking: “What is necessary and possible, then, Cohen asserts, is a recognition that each
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type of social thought, each school of economics, and so on, is relative to each’s opposing
type and that the assertions of each ‘are merely ordering principles for systematic
thinking,’ that the significance of any doctrine may lie only ‘in its function in organizing
inquiry’” (321).4
When Samuels later developed an interest in the nature of language as an interpretive
system, and re-approached economics as a particular kind of discourse and conversation,
he had occasion to reframe these views in terms of the idea of the hermeneutic circle.
Language is a system of interpretation, but “interpretation is interpretive-system specific”
implying that “there are no meta-criteria on which to choose between alternative theories,
etc., with any serious degree of conclusivity, except by selecting the premise on which rests
the theory thereby chosen” (Samuels, 1990, 11). This is the idea of the hermeneutic circle
whereby our understanding of the whole of a theory depends on the understanding of our
entry points while our understanding of our entry points depends on our understanding of
the whole of a theory. An important implication of the circle, then, is that our arguments
depend on our assumptions in a ‘self-referential’ way. Samuels advanced this analysis in
part to defend his matrix view and systematic relativism, since it was another way of
striking down linear ways of thinking.5 But doing so also allowed him to place special
emphasis on an idea that would become central to his defense of methodological pluralism:
the absence of meta-criteria or meta-principles. At the same time, it was their absence,
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coupled with his view of human intellectual psychology, which produced what might be
called an existential dilemma for the theorist and policy-maker.

3.

The economist’s existential dilemma

Behavioral economics became influential in economics at the end of the twentieth century
by showing that people’s psychological heuristics and biases play an important role in
economic behavior. Samuels, however, anticipated this sort of argument, though in a
domain much closer to home for the economist, namely, in connection with the heuristics
and biases of theorists and policy-makers. Contrary to the self-congratulating view of
many in the economics profession that their own research and investigative practices are
objective, scientific, and free of bias, Samuels believed that economists, like all other
people, were subject to certain kinds of blindness and willful misperception that not
infrequently gave them an unrealistic view of their research.6 Thus, on the one hand, as
emphasized above, human thinking is in Samuels’ view is always perspectival. Yet on the
other hand, ironically, theorists perennially claim that they are able to advance general
theories more or less on their own or independently of one another (or at least only in the
company of those with whom they share the same fundamental assumptions), that is,
without a sense of how their theories obtain what standing they have only within a matrix
of ideas. Samuels asks, then, why is it that economists are so disinclined to recognize the
role of perspective and the interaction of often opposed ideas in the development of
6
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economics and in their own research? His answer is simple: “The belabored human mind
tends to prefer simplicity and unity to complexity and diversity and thereby to perceive
only burdensomeness in the latter” (Samuels, 1972, 307). In effect, a simplicity heuristic or
bias in human psychology causes theorists to neglect the complexity and diversity that
reality actually exhibits, and thus causes them to resist “open-endedness and ambiguity
(such as plurality of meaning)” that economic theory requires, instead preferring
“determinacy and closure” (Samuels, 1998, 301; also cf. 1997, 67).
One manifestation of this is the tyranny of the received view, or “the role of the received
cognitive system” (1972, 310), which imparts a special dynamic to the history of economics
and policy. Faced with the challenge of how a multi-faceted reality ought to be addressed,
theorists take what they already find in place and apparently accepted by others as
evidently coherent and explanatory of the world.7 But this overlooks something that
Samuels believed a casual review of the history of economics readily ought to show us,
namely, that “the history of the discipline is a history of controversy,” a history, moreover,
in which the same controversies appear to be replayed and continually replicated (314).
Seeing this as its history, one might think, would teach the economics profession that a
matrix approach, or something along the lines of Samuels’ view, would constitute a better
guide to understanding how economic theories develop. That this has not happened is
grounds for Samuels’ claim that economists are no less free of psychological bias than other
people in having a preference for determinacy and closure that prevents them from seeing
the world as it is. Yet this alone does not add up to an existential dilemma.
7
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The economist’s existential dilemma, then, arises out of this bias combined with a second
psychological characteristic, namely, that people are disposed to make theoretical and
policy choices despite the absence of secure meta-principles for grounding those choices.
Samuels frames this in terms of the theorists’ reliance on methodological entry points,
despite the fact that they are self-referential and imply circular (in hermeneutic terms)
argumentation.
Methodological pluralism ultimately rests on a belief in the necessity of choice in the
absence of a single conclusive final methodological or epistemological principle.
Choice has to be made between alternative methodologies each of which has its own
internal limitations, and there is no single unequivocal, conclusive metaprinciple on
which to make that choice (1998: 301).
Thus, not only do human beings exhibit a preference for simplicity and unity, and not only
do they prefer to act rather than do nothing, but they also willfully turn a blind eye to the
limitations their chosen points of entry possess. One might accordingly then say that the
human response to the complexity and diversity of social reality is to act so as to impose
order on the world. This, in fact, is one way to explain part of Samuels’ oft-stated
provocative definition of economics: “Economics is knowledge, it is social control, and it is
psychic balm” (Samuels, 1972: 314). Neither the knowledge nor social control parts of his
definition would surprise most economists (though the idea of social control would likely
need to be re-phrased in more positive terms as the desirability of enacting policy based on
good economics), but many would think the psychic balm idea in need of explanation. The
interpretation offered here for Samuels is that it is the effect of a deep psychological need
11

to make the world appear as we would like it to be. Economics then serves this purpose
when it recasts the world as harmonious and unified rather than as ridden by
indeterminacy and conflict, however much this might betray economics’ other goals of
knowledge and social control. Let us turn, then, to Samuels’ case for methodological
pluralism.

3.

Methodological pluralism

Samuels’ methodological pluralism constitutes the posture he believed was called for in
light of his view of the cognitive character of the economics profession. One might
reasonably think it too enlightened a sort of position to recommend to economists, given
his view of human psychology, but to that concern he might have had an answer. For him
methodological pluralism is an epistemological pluralism, and not an ontological pluralism,
which denies there is a single reality. Samuels did not deny there is a single social reality;
he simply saw that social reality as heterogeneous and diverse.8 Thus, if the greatest
resistance to pluralism is based on thinking it includes ontological pluralism, then setting
this aside might allow the merits of methodological or epistemological pluralism to be
fairly considered. Indeed, there are grounds for thinking the economics profession might
be disposed to methodological/epistemological pluralism, since it already practices a sort
of de facto pluralism in employing a division of labor across areas of specialization which
allows the questions, methods, and criteria for validating research to vary by specialization.
8
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In effect, then, economists already agree that the social reality of the economy is
heterogeneous and diverse, and accept that it needs to be approached in multiple ways
with a variety of concepts and methods.
But this still leaves the worry which many have that an explicit commitment to
epistemological pluralism, because it abandons the standard of a single truth and
knowledge, is relativist and must thus imply skepticism. On this view, the notion that truth
is multiple renders the concept of truth itself meaningless. In the ‘anything goes’ version of
this critique, then, everything and nothing is true, implying that we can believe nothing,
and are confined to skepticism. Furthermore, with this line of argument, epistemological
pluralism even undermines itself, since it is no more likely true than false.
Samuels’ argument, however, is not that the concept of truth is meaningless, but rather
presupposes the concept of truth in arguing that there are no ultimate criteria or metaprinciples by which we can definitively say what it is that is true.
The rationale of methodological pluralism is that, in the absence of metacriteria by
which by one methodology can be shown unequivocally to be superior to all others,
analyses should not be rejected solely on the basis of methodological
considerations. On the other hand, methodological anarchy is avoided by
emphasizing, first, the identification of the precise nature, grounds, and limits of
particular methodologies; second, the importance of the process by which
knowledge and the credentials of knowledge are pursued and knowledge worked
out; and third, the process of criticism itself (301).
13

It is not the case, then, that ‘anything goes’ per se, though it could conceivably be the case
that ‘anything goes’ which comes with sufficient clarity about the “grounds and limits” of
the methodology employed in its defense. In terms of the idea that entry points have a selfreferential character, Samuels’ view is simply that one needs to be explicit about the
grounds for one’s positions, since they provide the justification for those positions. They
may not be absolute justifications by some abstract philosophical standard, but they are
justifications nonetheless because they allow the community of researchers to judge,
relative to the matrix of practices employed across the whole of research, the adequacy of a
particular researcher’s position on an issue. In effect, what Samuels seeks to do is make the
individual researcher’s subjective hermeneutic circle a virtuous circle by making it public,
known, and transparent. Central to this, as he states above, is that this make clear to all
what the “process [is] by which knowledge and the credentials of knowledge are pursued
and knowledge worked out,” and simultaneously places a premium on criticism to maintain
openness and scrutiny of individual researcher’s work in that process. This is the means by
which objectivity is achieved in science.
Samuels of course was an institutionalist economist in the Veblen-Commons tradition as
well as an historian and methodologist of economics, and this dimension of his thinking
needs to be emphasized in explaining his understanding of methodological pluralism. Thus
what he states in the passage above clearly reflects his institutional analysis of the
economics profession as an organized research community that functions according to
conventions, explicit rules, inherited practices, and organizing structures. When he calls
for methodological pluralism, then, what he is recommending is not so much the adoption
14

of a new set of philosophical convictions by economists, but a change in the institutional
nature of the economics profession, particularly in regard to its conventions about the
production and evaluation of research and policy. That is, methodological pluralism does
not make claims about what counts as truth and knowledge (and good policy) in economics
– this is the job of economists themselves – but rather it focuses on how the claims which
economists make about what they believe to be true come to have the standing they do. In
effect, truth is embedded in those social structures which allow the economics profession
to rule on the particular claims individual researchers make.
This, then, is what Samuels understood as a social constructivist approach to science and
knowledge (Samuels, 1995). Social constructivism is a sociology of scientific knowledge
approach which argues that the social organization of scientific communities determines
what counts as knowledge in those communities (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Hands,
2001, 190ff, 207ff). In contrast non-constructivist views assume that the nature of the
world determines the content of science, and that scientists are only left the task of finding
out what this is. Samuels explicitly rejects this position on the grounds that it constitutes a
form of scientific determinism which removes “room for human free will and decisions,
including determination of which causal process(es) will be set in motion and/or
reinforced, and how” (Samuels, 1993, 237). That is, the notion that the nature of the world
is given and inalterable not only rules out any substantive role for scientists in explaining
the world but also rules out the possibility that scientists may reasonably change their
beliefs about the nature of the world. Samuels characterizes his resistance to this kind of
thinking his ‘limited but affirmative defense of nihilism’ where what he is nihilistic about
15

are non-constructivist accounts of science that ignore the way in which the scientists and
the organization of science influences science. A methodological pluralist, consequently,
not only accepts that there are no conclusive meta-criteria that underlie science, but also
defends the principle that the openness of science needs to be seen as central to the
organization of science.
Thus Samuels was not a skeptic in the ordinary sense of that term meaning someone who
always doubts and holds no firm beliefs. He certainly held firm beliefs about economics,
which he also regarded as true beliefs, though he thought it important to emphasize that
this included the possibility that he could be mistaken. Nor was Samuels a relativist if that
is taken to imply radical subjectivism about ideas. Rather with his matrix approach to
meaningfulness he judged individual beliefs as ‘relative to’ something in particular, namely
the totality of views on any given subject, which taken together provided as objective a
foundation for knowledge as he thought is available to us. Methodological pluralism,
therefore, is best seen as a doctrine regarding what is needed to secure good epistemic
practices in scientific communities. In this regard, it is probably close to what many
economists and scientists would defend were they to step back from what they individually
advocate in their own work and think in terms of what maintains policy and research in
their fields overall. I turn in closing, then, to possible implications of Samuels’ thinking for
the historiography of the history of economics.
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4.

Samuels’ methodological pluralism and the historiography of the history of

economics
Samuels’ own view of historiographic practice in the history of economics drew upon his
training at the University of Wisconsin where he was systematically exposed to different
and often strongly opposed schools of thought by his professors (Samuels, 1996). And, as
he had made the economic role of government the focus of his research, and as this subject
is one of the most polarizing in economics, he became aware from quite early on that
schools of thought, over and above laying out their views, devoted remarkable amount of
rhetorical effort to legitimizing their respective standpoints. At the same time, he also
came to believe that the desire to legitimate ideas often came at the expense of good
science, because a steadfast defense of a view is one-sided by nature. Accordingly he
developed his matrix approach to meaningfulness specifically as a response to this
legitimation problem. But of course economists’ impulse to legitimate their approaches is
not eliminated by taking a matrix approach. Indeed, Samuels’ matrix approach was
designed to accommodate and compensate for this impulse by producing a discourse
whose wider scope comprehended and exposed an array of conflicting views.
One lesson in this is that historians of economics need to recognize and somehow separate
out the role that economists’ efforts to legitimize their standpoints plays in the articulation
of their views. In principle this may seem a reasonable goal, but in practice it may well be
doubted that clear line can be drawn between advancing an idea and seeking to promote it.
Indeed, Samuels’ matrix approach does not actually attempt to make this distinction, but
instead adopts a more indirect strategy in simply juxtaposing different types of views in the
17

hope that we may then be able to distinguish promotion from content, and thereby judge
the respective merits of any given approach relative to others. I suggest, then, in the spirit
of his thinking that we add two direct methods of assessing the weight and significance of
legitimizing discourse in economics: one that follows a traditional historiographic method
and another that involves historians re-appraising the role that methodological reasoning
plays in economists’ defenses of their respective standpoints.
The traditional method involves identifying value judgments in discourse claimed to be
positive and value-free. Legitimization operates on two levels in such cases. First, a text
said to be positive and value-free is claimed to be objective and scientific, and on those
grounds then said to merit acceptance. Second, the particular value judgments which are
suppressed in the text are implicitly authorized under the cover of objectivity and science
(demonstrating ironically that ‘is’ does imply ‘ought’). Historians of economics, however,
have established methods for detecting hidden value judgments. As Samuels emphasized
in his own work on economic discourse (1990), language is variable in meaning, and thus
often makes normative connotations close associations of seemingly value-neutral terms
and expressions. A good example is ‘rational’ as used in standard choice theory in
economics. The term gets is technical meaning from axioms applied to preferences which
have no immediate normative content. But rational choices are also ones that satisfy
individual preferences, so to be ‘rational’ is suddenly also to satisfy one’s preferences. In
addition, in ordinary language ‘rational’ is a term of praise, so choice theory in economics
essentially tells us people ought to satisfy their preferences, whereas of course there are

18

many other meanings of ‘rational’ and associated things that people ought to do in order to
be rational.9
Economists who represent rational choice theory as an objective and scientific account of
choice behavior, then, are engaged in a legitimizing discourse that is distinct and separate
from their analysis of preference-motivated choice. Their analysis of preference-motivated
choice counts as an explanation of certain types of choices people make, but their claim that
analysis of preference-motivated choice is rational, where that implies people ought to act
on their preferences, mixes in and conceals value-judgments in the interest of legitimizing
that view of choice as a universal theory of choice and rationality.
This historiographic method of analyzing economic texts is a well-established strategy for
separating out legitimizing economics discourse from discourse that articulates economic
views (if perhaps infrequently employed by historians of economics). A second less
common strategy directly addresses ways in which economists defend their respective
standpoints. This strategy was actively employed by the University of Amsterdam History
and Methodology of Economics group (Mark Blaug, Marcel Boumans, Harro Maas, Tiago
Mata, Mary Morgan, Geert Reuten, Peter Rodenburg, myself, and others),10 and involved
examining the ways in which economists selectively appropriate methodological tools and
also past episodes in the history of economics to promote and legitimate their own
research approaches. The Amsterdam group devoted special attention to the recent
9
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history of economics. Thus one example from recent economics of this kind of legitimizing
strategy is how proponents of the subjective well-being or happiness approach developed
in behavioral economics justified that approach by arguing that it was shown to be
methodologically progressive by early English utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham (e.g.,
Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin, 1997). The strategy of such (arguably Whig) arguments is
to defend a view, which may be contested and perhaps not theoretically or empirically
particularly well-founded, by saying that not only has that view been held by a notable
figure in the history of economics, but more importantly by suggesting that the economic
methodology involved, as associated with certain types of explanatory concepts and
potential empirical justifications, justifies that approach. That is, the prime defense of a
theory is meta-theory, or economic methodology. Further, since citing notable proponents
is generally seen to be a weak defense of a theory (though still commonly employed), the
weight of legitimation here falls on the recourse to methodology. Samuels of course would
be quick to remind us that there are no absolutes in this domain either, but it is interesting
to speculate on why this particular method of legitimation might be appealing to
economists.
Most obviously, making reference to methodological strategies claimed to support a view
suggests that the research involved in producing that view has proper scientific credentials,
implying that the explanations provided ought to be regarded as well grounded. But there
is another way to look at the role methodological argument plays for economists in
justifying their views which is especially evident when our focus as historians of economics
is recent economics. Note, then, that in contrast to the older history of economics which is
20

largely past us and seems comparatively settled, recent economics, as still incomplete and
open-ended, is unclear in its value, since it may turn out that what seems important today
is not tomorrow. In fact it is an illusion that past economics was not also open-ended and
unclear in value at the time, though it is understandable with the weight of history before
them that that historians often fail to approach the past with a sense of the risks research
always carries. In any event, what recent economics tells us about economists’ recourse to
methodological arguments is that they offer an appearance of closure which their
explanations alone typically lack. This is especially important since economists have come
to do theory less and model more, since theory at least makes claims to generality, while no
one denies that models are by nature partial accounts of the world. Indeed from Samuels’
perspective they are examples par excellence of selective perception, and thus inescapably
open-ended forms of representation even if models seem highly determined in virtue of
being carefully specified. What we then see, when we look at recent economics, is that
economic methodology arguments are often appropriated as a means of advancing
sophisticated standpoint justifications meant to accommodate the specific perspectives the
researcher has chosen to adopt.
At the same time, interestingly, this recourse to legitimizing methodological argument on
the part of economists rarely draws on, and indeed operates at significant remove from the
specialist economics methodology literature.11 In effect, economists employing this type of
legitimizing strategy need to be in a position to employ it selectively as well, and without
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part of philosophers and economic methodologists on the subject of modeling.
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interference from researchers specialized in the field of economic methodology who might
dispute how methodological concepts are interpreted and applied. This further shows the
legitimizing nature of such appropriations, but also makes it possible to see more clearly
what the substantive content of the relevant view is when this adventitious methodology
discourse is stripped away.
In closing, it is worth emphasizing again that Samuels was not a skeptic in the ordinary
sense of that term. He did not deny, that is, that economic explanations often contain
valuable content which we may accept, at least provisionally, as being true of the world.
Further, that we change our views of what we regard as true only reinforces the reliance
we place on the category of truth as a tool of thinking, if not as an ontological category.
What was problematic for him was the response that many researchers and policy-makers
seem prone to exhibit to this unsettling constant change in what gets counted as true. This
is the source of the legitimizing impulse in economics which he thought makes the process
of criticism that is necessary to science all the more difficult to carry out (or as he would
say, that continually ‘obfuscates’ that process). But he was also convinced that a human
desire for simplicity and unity will never be abated. Thus it remains a task for historians of
economics to always parse the wheat from the chaff. To be good at doing this required that
one be a methodological pluralist.
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